Showing posts with label plague. Show all posts
Showing posts with label plague. Show all posts

Friday, 29 November 2024

THE PLEONECTIC RIFT

Dick Pountain /The Political Quarterly/ 11 Nov 2024 04:41

The Greatest Of All Plagues: How Economic Inequality Shaped Political Thought From Plato To Marx by David Lay Williams: Princeton University Press; Sept 2024; pp424; £30.00

Pleonexia is a Greek word that means insatiable greed, avarice, covetousness, a desire to have more without limit. Think of it as an opposite to anorexia: eating nothing versus eating everything. David Lay Williams' book is about economic inequality as perceived and condemned by seven great thinkers from Plato to Marx, all of whom were familiar with the word, and employed it in their condemnations. In fact “Pleonexia, the Greatest of All Plagues” would have been another excellent title for this book (though he and PUP wisely chose a less arcane one). The book is specifically about economic, as opposed to other forms of inequality:

“...unless otherwise expressly stated, when speaking of 'economic inequality,' I mean what economists sometimes call 'wealth inequality', as opposed to 'income inequality'. Although income and wealth are often strongly correlated, sometimes they are not.”

So it's not another account of the politics and sociology of inequality but rather an exploration in moral philosophy - spanning 2300 years of history - of the attitudes of Plato (a classical republican); Jesus Christ (founder of Christianity); Thomas Hobbes (monarchist); Jean-Jacques Rousseau (early modern republican); Adam Smith (classical liberal); John Stuart Mill (utilitarian); and Karl Marx (communist), not all of whom are radical egalitarians. Indeed Plato, Jesus, Hobbes and Smith are more often invoked by conservatives, but Williams convincingly demonstrates that despite their differences on other social and economic matters, they all understood that vast wealth gaps corrode the fabric of society, degrade politics and loosen family ties. Inequality lies at the root of the collapse of most empires and civilisations. 

Williams avoids presenting detailed economic statistics for the era of each thinker, instead referring to such work by other experts like Thomas Piketty, Walter Scheidel and Charles Lindblom. Similarly he doesn’t devote much space to detailed analysis of the mechanism by which inequality erodes the social fabric, leaving that too to sociologists like Wilkinson and Pickett or Mike Savage (his bibliography runs to 24 pages). What he embarks on instead is to demonstrate that all his chosen thinkers believed that economic inequality is wrong, and to show that reasons for this judgement evolved over time, from Plato’s sickness of the soul (pleonexia) to Karl Marx’s capitalist who “ruthlessly forces the human race to produce for production’s sake”. 

His purpose directly concerns contemporary politics as he seeks to unmask various ways in which current commentators of both Left and Right are misinterpreting these thinkers to ignore or to justify the rapidly increasing inequality which so obviously lead to Donald Trump’s devastating election victory in November 2024. The billionaire moguls of Silicon Valley who 20 years ago appeared mostly sympathetic to the Democrats have pivoted to Trump: Elon Musk pranced on platforms with him; Jeff Bezos forbade his Washington Post editors to endorse a candidate (ie. Harris); while Mark Zuckerberg announced that he’d made a “20-year mistake” and “political miscalculation”. The stock price rally following Trump’s victory increased their collective fortunes by $64 billion overnight...

Right-wing free-market followers of Hayek and Friedman claim that economic egalitarianism is an invention of twentieth-century liberals, and that the Western canon from Plato to Smith uniformly supports inequality, so inequality’s critics are merely expressing resentment and envy of the wealthy. But Williams contends that many Left opponents of inequality also fail to produce convincing arguments for why it’s wrong, leaving them exposed to such an envy slur. Some other Left-wing critics regard poverty to be the more important moral problem and concentrated wealth and inequality to be morally less relevant: “fight poverty, not inequality.” Steven Pinker for example makes the 'sufficientarian' argument that feeding, housing and clothing the poor outweighs concern over excessive wealth.

Williams devotes a separate chapter to each of his thinkers. Today we see Plato as an  elitist, given that his ideal republic was to be ruled only by philosophers and maintained by slaves, but Williams argues that one must looks past this (slavery was ubiquitous in that epoch) to his major political works ‘Republic’ and ‘Laws’, which show a concern for economic equality among free citizens. He claimed these citizens needed to possess four primary virtues – wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage – and that greed, inequality and oligarchy corroded all three, leading to social disharmony and civil war. This wasn’t merely a theoretical conclusion: fifth-century Athens experienced two oligarchic coups against democracy, followed by periods of reform under Solon and Lycurgus, and Plato learned from this history that extreme wealth, poverty, and inequality don’t only collapse political regimes but also distort individual souls through insatiable greed, or pleonexia, which was therefore “the greatest of all plagues” (Laws, 744d).

In one of the smaller colonies of the Roman Empire an egalitarian tendency existed among Hebrew-speaking tribes, whose prophets had written for centuries against the evils of excessive wealth and usury. In the 7th century BC Palestine had a fertile agriculture that enabled landlords to accumulate wealth, and the prophet Amos decries the way they exploited peasant farmers by loaning them money and appropriating their lands when they failed to repay. The religious authorities tried to defuse this class antagonism using the Mosaic Law, which prescribed that every seventh year be a ‘sabbath year’ during which slaves were freed, debts cancelled and land left fallow for the poor to forage. Every seventh sabbatical year was a ‘jubilee’ which restored all land to its original owners. Needless to say such radically distributive policies were enforced less and less as religious leaders became wealthy themselves, and by the time Jesus of Nazareth was born, in Galilee province, he founded a new Christian religion by expelling moneylenders from the Temple.

Thomas Hobbes is now remembered for ‘Leviathan’, in which he strongly advocates concentration of all power in a monarch, in reaction to the chaos unleashed by the English Civil War. His economic ideas are therefore also often assumed to favour the emerging merchant capitalism, but Williams points out that in his other great work ‘Behemoth’ Hobbes relates that a growing concentration of wealth among the merchant class made them ‘insolent and presumptuous of impunity’ eventually rising to threaten the sovereign authority, and precipitating violent civil war. Hobbes was keenly aware that as feudal patronage slowly gave way to open markets, inflation seriously eroded the livelihood of ex-peasants as they became wage labourers.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau inaugurated the modern attitude to inequality, calling it by that name in ‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’ and questioning the legitimacy of rulers who abuse their authority to protect the wealthy from the poor. He held that legitimate authority only exists by common consent and by pursuing the common good, and that in economically unequal societies “the apparent power is in the hands of the magistrate and the real power is in those of the rich” – the ideas that provided the intellectual impetus for the French Revolution. 

Adam Smith remains the doyen of free-market enthusiasts everywhere, but Williams  convincingly demonstrates that even he was grievously concerned over the detrimental effect of economic inequality on social cohesion, as for example in ‘The Wealth Of Nations’ where he remarked “Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many”. The result, as Eric Hobsbawm once observed, was that industrial relations in the first half of the eighteenth century could be described as “collective bargaining by riot.” John Kay, inventor of the flying shuttle used in the weaving machines that displaced countless workers, was forced to flee Britain after his home was destroyed by an angry mob in 1753. 

Williams thereafter arrives at the more familiar and (perhaps) less contested path to modern opposition to inequality via the utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill and the outright communism of Karl Marx. Each of his seven chapters ends with a conclusion summarising that thinker’s suggested measures to combat economic inequality, ranging from alms-giving, to Lycurgus’ abolition of gold and silver currency, from debt sabbaths to highly progressive wealth taxes and restrictions on inheritance, to educational reform or socialist revolution.

Stopping with Marx feels like quitting just as it gets interesting as Williams is well aware, but he ruefully admits that to proceed into the 20th century with its two world wars, revolutions, organised labour and welfare states, would require a whole extra book. That’s certainly true, for the logical next steps would have to tackle communism versus social democracy, the reformist ideas of Maynard Keynes and Galbraith, the historic dip in inequality that Thomas Piketty documented in ’Capital In The Twenty First Century’, and the fossil-fuelled climate crisis precipitated by rising Western affluence. At that point Williams would have left moral philosophy for active political economy. 

Social democracy has become the first effective system for controlling inequality through regulation and progressive taxation, but has also brought unforeseen consequences: the downward spread of prosperity induces pleonexia among the electorate (though we now call it ‘consumerism’) accompanied by an aversion to paying taxes. This, and social democracy's failure to create transnational regulatory bodies, opens a loophole through which political reaction and pleonectic oligarchy have reversed the flow, a story still being written, to which Trump’s second term might prove the finale. Williams’ choice of end-point was perhaps wise, and the work he has produced is a valuable tool for progressives to continue the argument, if it does indeed continue.   

Dick Pountain, London

Saturday, 14 July 2012

GLOBAL CATASTROPHES AND TRENDS


Dick Pountain/November 25, 2008/Political Quarterly

TITLE: "Global Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years"
AUTHOR: Vaclav Smil
PUBLISHER: MIT Press
PUBLISHED: September 2008, hard cover, 320 pp, £19.95

REASONING ABOUT RISK

“What is the likelihood that Islamic terrorism will develop into a massive, determined quest to destroy the West?” “What is the likelihood that a massive wave of global Islamic terrorism will accelerate the Western transition to non-fossil fuel energies?” Two questions, plucked from a late chapter, exemplify both the style and the substance of Vaclav Smil’s impressive and important review of the factors that will shape our global future over the next half century. Firstly there’s that word “likelihood”, which for Smil is a quantitative concept, something we must try to measure to the best of our ability while not kidding ourselves about how good our answers are. Secondly, the questions seek to relate two separate disciplines, politics and energy usage. Smil’s answer to both questions is that we don’t know and that our best guesses provide “at best some constraining guidelines but do not offer any reliable basis for relative comparisons of diverse events or their interrelations”.

Smil is not a proponent of any grand theory about how the world works, but neither is he a passive agnostic wallowing in history-as-a-torrent-of-accidents, nor yet just a smug empiricist. He believes we have a duty to extract all the information we can from past events using the methods of science (particularly statistics intelligently applied), and that even where we can’t know for sure we can often put a figure on the extent of our ignorance. But he’s acutely aware that risk assessments based only on figures fail to capture the psychological dimension: how unsafe we feel is as important politically as how unsafe we actually are. 

Global Catastrophes and Trends is a review and interpretation of nearly 800 recent papers in economics, demographics, environmental and political science, but Smil’s book goes well beyond mere collection or even distillation. Smil, a professor at the University of Manitoba and himself an acclaimed expert on the energetics of complex systems (those ~800 papers include 15 of his own), largely succeeds in imposing on this mass of technical material a uniform and rational framework for thinking about risks and challenges. We are currently living through a period of doom and gloom in which we face not only a variety of real threats – economic recession, terrorism, climate change, political instability – but also a constant bombardment of sensationalized predictions from our attention- and sales-seeking mass media that make it very difficult to think straight about such threats. Smil is determined not to join this babble and so eschews forecasts and scenarios: you will find no predictions here that “X will happen by year Y” or that “trend X will peak in year Y”.

Instead Smil starts by drawing a basic distinction between fatal discontinuities, that is low-probability events that could “change everything” like a huge volcanic eruption or collision with an asteroid, and persistent, gradually unfolding trends that might have equally profound effects over the long term, like global warming. He establishes common units for assessing and comparing the probabilities of such threats and for quantifying the damage they would cause. Chapter 2 attempts to compute the probabilities of various fatal discontinuities, concluding that the least unlikely – and the ones we can do something about – remain nuclear war (accidental or deliberate) and virulent influenza pandemic. It is worth spending money on vaccines and antiviral drugs, and also on astronomical surveys of asteroid orbits, but otherwise resources are better spent to avert more gradual threats like global warming. Chapter 3 discusses gradual trends, which covers both the transition to an economy based on non-fossil fuels and the rise and decline of the most prominent nations over the next 50 years. He is skeptical about the prospects for alternative energy sources – on scientific grounds based on energy density which he explains with great clarity – and for carbon sequestration, concluding that our best hope of slowing global warming is to reduce overall energy consumption through more efficient usage and serious lifestyle changes. Smil’s approach to environmental degradation avoids moralizing and ideology, usefully pointing out that the carbon cycle is not the only one with whose operation we are interfering, and that the nitrogen cycle is even harder to mend.

His summary of the prospects of each competitor for global supremacy is equally devastating: Europe and Japan are doomed to runner-up status by ageing populations; Islam is too divided to achieve the New Caliphate despite high fertility; US power is already waning (here Smil preempts and confirms the recent National Intelligence Council’s report Global Trends 2005) thanks to its decline of manufacturing relative to China and colossal trade deficit; China itself has insuperable environmental problems and lacks “soft power” thanks to language and restricted intellectual freedom. He expects a turbulent next 50 years without a single hegemonic power, and with many conflicts over resources and dominance.  

Smil writes prose that is mercifully jargon-free, though unavoidably rich in technical terms: he makes judicious use of well-chosen graphs, but I should warn non-mathematical readers that familiarity with logarithmic scales, in particular log/log graphs, will help in following some of his arguments. He quantifies risk starting from the central fact of human life, general mortality (we all die eventually) which he assigns a value of 10­-6 deaths/person-exposure-hour: in the West, one person in a million dies every hour on average. Other risks are compared to this baseline value on a log/log scale, which chillingly suggests that death in hospital from preventable medical error is a greater danger than smoking, terrorism or car crash, and that young black male citizens of Philadelphia actually reduce their chance of gunshot death by serving in Iraq rather than staying home. For me the book’s most significant omission is that Smil doesn’t quantify the risk of not living in the affluent West…

Any bookie will tell you that we’re pretty poor at estimating risk, but our behavior suggests we have an innate grasp of general mortality because we only accept risks within around one order of magnitude of it in everyday life – say when we travel by car (10­-7 d/peh) rather than safer train or plane (10-8), or smoke cigarettes (2x10-6, about the same as hang gliding). Only a handful of thrill-seeking extreme sport nuts will embrace a 10-2 risk like BASE Jumping for fun. However such figures only tell part of the story: psychological factors like Understanding, Exposure and Dread are equally important. A citizen of Baghdad faces the same statistical risk of death from bomb or kidnap that a New Yorker does from car crash, but risks we understand like car driving are better accepted than inexplicable acts of random violence; the Baghdadi is exposed 24 hours a day while the New Yorker only 1-2 hours; and the idea of being blown to bits is peculiarly horrible. Politicians pay more attention to this psychological dimension than to the underlying physical risks, leading to the paradox (also remarked in David Runciman’s recent book Good Intentions) that the more responsible the politician, the more rather than less likely they are to over-react to crises like terrorist attacks.

I found this book an enormously refreshing, if demanding, read. In place of the untestable scenarios presented by most “futurologists”, Smil offers hard facts where they are available and sensible cautions where they are not. He offers few concrete policy proposals but rather a rational method of assessment that ought to constrain and guide thinking about policy. Smil ends on this note: “There is so much we do not know, and pretending otherwise is not going to make our choices clearer or easier. None of us knows which threats and concerns will soon be forgotten and which will become tragic realities. That is why we repeatedly spend enormous resources in the pursuit of uncertain (even dubious) causes and are repeatedly unprepared for real threats and unexpected events”. I think Smil should probably be set as homework for every member of parliament, and there will be a test later…

PLUNDERING THE POLITY

 Dick Pountain /Political Quarterly/ 13th May 2026 : 01:20pm Book Review: The Asset Class: How Private Equity Turned Capitalism Against Itse...